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INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF REVOLVING FUND LOAN (RFL)
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNITY FOREST
PLANTATIONS (CFP)
Entin Hendartin , Bramasto Nugroho , Hariadi Kartodihardjo and
Dudung Darusman
In 2007, the MoF (Ministry of Forestry) cq Ditjen BPK (Directorate General of
Forest Production Development) has initiated the Revolving Fund Loan for
Community Forest Plantations (RFL CFP). The program was established through
Regulation of the Minister of Forestry No P.48/Menhut-II/2007 jo regulation of the
Minister of Forestry no P.64/Men-Hut-II/2009 related to standard cost of IFP
(Industrial Forest Plantations) and CFP (Coomunity Forest Plantations), and the
regulation of the Minister of Forestry No P.9/Menhut-II/2008 in March 24 , 2008
regarding the requirements for FarmerGroups to obtain theRFLCFP.
Up to August 2011 the disbursement of the RFL CFP has reached 0.0035% of the
set target. This performance may have reflected the institutional forms that govern the
relationship beetween the principal (RFL CFP lender especially PSA CFDF (Public
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ABSTRACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this studywas to formulate effective and efficient institutions of Revolving
Fund Loans for Community Forest Plantation development (RFL CFP) in accordance with
variation of field conditions. Benchmarking techniques were used to formulate the institution of
RFLCFP. For that purpose, Independent ofDirect Assistance Rural AgribusinessDevelopment
(IDA RAD) from the Ministry of Agriculture was selected as a benchmark as it was good in
performance. The study was conducted in three provinces, i.e. Riau, South Kalimantan
(November 2008 to April 2009) andWest Java (May 2009 to February 2011). Comparative study
was used to analyze the institutions based on the agency theory. The results showed that the
institutional of RFL CFP havenot accomodated the differences in characteristics, perceptions
and capacities of the parties. As a result, the institutions have not been able to overcome the risk
of moral hazard, adverse selection and high transaction costs. On the other hand, the institution
of IDARADhas a positive impact on agency relationship.High repayments by IDARADagent
and the increasing number of agents each year have proved the impact.
Keywords: Institutional, relationship, revolving loan fund, community Forest Plantation,
CDARAD
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Service Agency - Center for Forest Development Funding) from the Ministry of
Forestry) and the agents (RFL CFP recipients, especially farmers). The RFL CFP
Institutions (such as organizations and rules of the game) are the institutions that
regulate the relationship between principal and the agent or often called the agency
relationship (Jensen and Meckling, 1986; Eisenhardt, 1989; Prihadi, 2010) suspected to
have an influence on performance in the principal agent relationship (Maskin, 2001;
Gibbons, 2005; Prihadi andNugroho, 2007; Prihadi, 2010). The following problems are
likely to be found: (1) wrong selection of partners (adverse selection risk) before credit
agreement ( ) and (2) irresponsible mentallity or untrustworthiness (moral
hazard) after the credit agreement ( ). The phenomena mentioned above have
raised questions of the research as follows: (1) whether the caracteristics of the farmers
or candidate agents are well known by the principal, and (2) whether the institutions of
RFLCFPare able to overcome adverse selection andmoral hazard.
Based on the above explanation, this study is aimed to formulate efective and
efficient loan institutions for the CFP development that fit to varying field conditions.
The specific objectives are: (1) to know the process of policy development regarding the
RFL CFP, (2) to understand the organizational form of the PSA CFDF as fund
management of the RFL CFP, and (3) to know the characteristics and perceptions of
stakeholders on theRFLCFP.
To achievethe research goals, it is necessary to have a succesfull credit agency as a
model. CDA RAD (Community Direct Aids of Rural Agribusiness Development)
from the Ministry of Agriculture was selected as a model due to the following reasons:
(1) Credits provided by theMoF such as KUKDAS (Watershed Conservation Business
Credit) andKUHR (Community Forest Business Credit) were considered unsuccessful
(MoF, 2005), (2) CDA RAD is able to increase the initial capital from 25 to 250% in
which the fund management is done by FGA (Farmers Group Association or
GAPOKTAN), and (3) the number of farmers whose CDA RAD beneficiaries is
continuously increase.
The research was conducted in three provinces: (1) Riau (Kuansing District), (2)
South Kalimantan (Tanah Laut District), on November 2008 until April 2009, and (3)
West Java (BogorDistrict), onMei 2009 until February 2011. Selection of the study sites
was conducted through rapid appraisal activities throughout Indonesia and preliminary
survey through interviews to the key informants and head of the households. Kuansing
and Tanah Laut Districts were selected due to some reasons: (1) wood processing
industries, such as wood working and pulp industries are exist, (2) competition of land
use between palm oil crops and timber plantations, (3two kinds of timber plantations
ex ante
ex post
II. RESEARCH METHODS
A. Study Site and General Information
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are present in the study sites, classified as fast growing species (mangiumandkadam) and
slow growing species (mahogany), (4) the two provinces were selected by MoF as the
location for Community Forest Plantations, and (5) there are active farmers cultivating
timber plantations.
Interviews and questionnaires to microcredit stakeholders were carried out by
purposive method. The total number of informants was 355 people including farmers,
representatives from MoF and working units of the province and district levels,
representatives from formal and non-formal financial institutions, academicians,
researchers, extension officers (BP3K - agriculture, fisheries and forestry extension
center at the sub-district level), BP4K (extension implementing agency for agriculture,
fisheries and forestry at district level) and the company's representatives. A detail
informants can be seen inTable 1.
Table 1. Detailes of informants
Study site Activities Informants Total
(Person)
Riau Open and Closed
interview
Farmers 103
FGD, and Open and
Closed interview
Stakeholders except
Farmers
21
South Kalimantan Open and Closed
interview
Farmers 153
FGD, Open and
Closed interview
Stakeholders except
Farmers
18
West Java Open and Closed
interview
Farmers 27
Ministy of
Agriculture
Open and Closed
interview
Stakeholders except
Farmers
8
Ministry o f
Forestry
Open and Closed
interview
Head and Staffs 17
Expert Open and Closed
interview
Academic ians, researchers,
bureaucrats
8
Total 355
161
B. Data Analysis
Two types of data (primary and secondary) were collected. Method of primary
data collection is done through recording, observation, interviews (open and closed
questions), and FGD (FocusGroupDiscussion). Secondary datawas collected through
studyof literatures such as regulations and decisions of policymakers related to theRFL
CFP. The methods of data analysis consisted of: (A) Content analysis (Bungin, 2007)
and analysis of policy space (IDS, 2006) and agency relationship (Jensen and Meckling,
1986; Eisenhardt, 1989; Prihadi, 2010), (B) Comparative institutional analysis
(Hirakuri, 2003), (C) Agency relationship (Jensen and Meckling, 1986), and (D)
Descriptive analysis (Bungin, 2007) and Analytical Hierarchy Process/AHP (Saaty,
2003). Further details of themethods are shown inTable 2.
1
2
Table 2. Methods of data analysis applied in the study
1
2
Some of the primary data, especially in the province of Riau and South Kalimantan obtained from the retrieval
data that has been done by a team from several institutions such as CIFOR, IPB and Research Institutions in the
twoprovinces.
FocusGroupsDiscussion (FGD) according toBungin (2007) is a data collection techniquewhich is generally done
in qualitative research, the goal is to find themeaning of a theme in the opinionor understanding of a group. FGD
is intended to avoid awrong interpretation of the researcher related to the focus on the problembeing studied.
Variable Indicator
Colection Data
Method
Analysis Data
Method
Policy Process
Formulation
All the rules that regulate
relationship between
principle and agent
Primary and
secondary
Document,
interviews, FGD
Content analysis
(Bungin , 2007;
Irawan, 2007), policy
space analysis (IDS ,
2006), and agency
relationship (Jensen
and Meckling, 1986;
Prihadi, 2010)
Organizations Vision or Goal s, human
resources, infrastructure,
authority related contract
Secondary data,
interviews, FGD
Open and closed
interviews, literature
study, comparative
institutional analysis
(Hirakuri , 2003)
Characteristics
and percep -
tions of the
stakeholders
Farmer characteristic,
marketing situation, market
access, farmer behavior on
credit, farmer perceptions
toward RFL CFP and CDA
RAD, perceptions of
stakeholder s (except for
farmers) toward RFL CFP
and CDA RAD
observations, open
and closed
interviews, FGD
Agency relationship
(Jensen and
Meckling , 1986)
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III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Principal Agent Relationship in the Regulations and Decisions on RFL CFP
The process of formulating regulations and decisions on theRFLCFP involves the
following facts: (1) The program was launched in haste. Essentially it was political
response fromMoF to the three development policy pillars from the IndonesianUnited
Cabinet namely: pro poor, pro job and pro growth (2) Annual and five year targets of
the RFLCFPwere determined only by calculation on the paper without support of an
in-depth research, (3) Insufficient capacity and capability of the parties that have been
understood by MoF, and the implications for rules are complicated as a form of high
prudence of MoF [29 steps to obtain IUPHHK HTR (Business licence for timber
utilzation CFP), 30 stages to get the RFL CFP, and involves 10 organizations], (4)
Increased capacity and capability of the parties planned to be carried out gradually after
the RFL CFP was launched, and (5) If the capacity and capabilities of the parties has
increased, theRFLCFP ruleswill be changed to a simpler form (the head of PSACFDF
personal communication).
Understanding on howRFLCFP policy formulated is very important as learning
material to improve the relationship between principal and agent and the RFL CFP
performance. Policy formulation process is not an easy process, especially when the
opportunity is not available. Narration, actor or network, political interest and
informationor knowledge is presented inTable 3.
Table 3. Policy Space of the RFL CFP
,
Analysis RFL CFP Policy Formulation Process
Discourse/
Narrative
MoF considers that farmers need financial support for the CFP so that
the funding agencies such as the Bank without collateral requirements are
needed (embodied in the form of PSA CFDF because farmers are not
bankable).
RFL CFP single scheme was created based on consideration to ease of
adminstration by the principal ; this condition illustrates that the capacity
of principal has not been sufficient and the aspiration of the agent has not
been taken into account
Actor/network Contributions of the parties is minor
Politics/Interest RFL CFP is a form of financial support at the discretion of CFP. The use
of Reforestation Fund was regulated in the Government Regulation ( PP
35/ 2002) concerning reforestation fund article 12, paragraph 3)
Information/
Knowledge
Participations of the parties on po licy formulation is minor
Source: IDS (2006), Description: the results of data analysis
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The policy process formulation of the RFL CFP supported by researchers and
practitioners is limited to the minimum area that can be managed by farmers and can
provide a decent profit. The financing schemes that are based on the standard of field
cost of theHPHTI (industrial forest concession) holders are incompatible with Lackey
(2007) Kartodihardjo (2008) who stated that “the application of policy in the field
requiring repaired framework that enables knowledge and information can be properly
adopted”.
PSA CFDF is the organization within the MoF which functions to manage the
RFL CFP and is based only in Jakarta. Constraints faced by the PSA CFDF are it has
limited authority as not all decisions can bemade internally andmayneed to refer to the
regulations applied in the other ministries (e.g. Ministry of Finance, Ministry of State
forOfficial Administration and Bureauchracy Reformation). Thereby, the PSACFDF
as principal has limited authority, i.e. it is not able to: (1) Control organizational change
and establish priorities, (2) Improve its own capacity and capabilities, (3) Determine the
procedures for implementing different tasks effectively and efficiently, (4) Impose
power to organizations regardless the structural level nor differentministries because it
has not command line.
Institution differencess (organization and rules of the game) between theRFLCFP
and theCDARADwill be presented atTable 4.
Table 4. Institutional comparison between RFL, CFP and CDA RAD
in
B. PSA CFDF Organization as a Fund Manager of the RFL CFP
Aspects RFL CFP CDA RAD
Situation
Purpose Improving the welfare of farmers
around the forest
Improving the welfare of farmers
around the forest
Human resources Low capacity and varied Higher capacity and equal level
Location of office in Jakarta in every village
Structure
Insitutional characteristics
Property right Government owned Privately owned
Jurisdiction
boundary
low High
Rules of the
representative
Representation is not running (Top
down)
Bottom up
contract
Procedure Long (included 30 steps and 10
organizations to get the RFL CFP)
Short (farmers came to GFA/PFI
office in his village)
Signing the
contract
Head of PSA CFDF (Prin cipal) and
head of farmer groups as agent s
Head of GFA/PFI (public
financial institutions) and
treasurer as principal, farmer as
agent
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Aspects RFL CFP CDA RAD
Control over
contracts
PSA CFDF, high transaction cost GFA/PFI, low transactions cost
Financing scheme single (Rp 8,531,900ha-1), min area 8
ha
Depends on farmers need
(agriculture, livestock, and trade)
RFL CFP
Distrbution
PSA CFDF (executing), transfer
through BRI
PFI* formed by GFA
RFL CFP refunds PSA CFDF through BRI PFI GFA
Breach of
contract
Handed over to the applicable law
(police, prosecutors)
PFI GFA and social sanctions
Behaviour
Training Adequate but uneven Fairly and evenly
Credit agreement Head of PSA CFDF, treasure and
head of farmer groups
Head of GFA/PFI, treasure r, and
farmers
Agent reports
(physical and
finacial)
exist none
Cost recovery Operating costs come from APBN
(the state income and expenditure),
the RFL CFP from reforestation
fund, the RFL CFP interest goes into
the forest development account (the
state treasury)
Operational costs from the loan
service
Performance
Adverse selection High, as human resources are not
sufficient
Low because principal have
sufficient human resources
Moral hazard Moral hazard is high because the
principal and agent are apart,
asymmetric information, social
sanction is not running
Moral hazard is lower because the
principle and agent near,
symmetric information, social
sanction is running
Information asymmetric Symmetric
Transaction cost High because of distance and long
procedure (high transaction cost)
Lower because of distance is near
and short procedur (high
transaction cost is lower)
Table 4. Continued
Description: the primary data processing is displayed using a table model Hirakuri (2003)
From Tabel 4 it is known that the RFL CFP (covering the situation, structure,
organization, and behavior) has contributed to the increase in transaction cost, moral
hazard and adverse selection.
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C. Characteristics of Farmers, Markets and Perceptions of the Parties toward the
RFL CFP
(
-
-
At present, the characteristics of farmers including the social system (social
sanctions and rules of the game) have not been taken into consideration by policy
makers of the RFL CFP as one of the factors that will influence the success of the RFL
CFP, whereas characteristics such as age, education, group abilities, planting skills will
affect the ability of prospective agents to carry out the CFP Cahyat ., 2007).
Variation of characteristics require different approaches, mentoring, and counseling. It
is expected that by understandingits characteristics, the risk ofmoral hazard and adverse
selection can beminimized.
Market aspects was not a principal concern. According to the principals, product
marketing is not their responsibilty, so it was not the focus. Market policy is limited to
timber pricing (existing policy is only about pricing of timber PPNo 6/2007, article 41
paragraph 1). Settingmechanism and dissemination to agents has not been discussed yet,
although aspects to the market is one factor that can increase the interest in planting
timber and affects the ability of agents to repay theRFLCFP.
Perceptions of farmers was assessed based on the content of Minister of Forestry
Regulation No. P.09/Menhut-II/2008 and head of the PSA CFDF regulation
P01/CFDF-1/2008. The results are: (1) A prospective agent had never heard any
information related to the RFL CFP, so they do not understand the requirements and
procedures of obtaining the RFL CFP (Riau 89%, South Kalimantan 100%, West Java
100%); (2) A prospective agent could only manage an area of maximum 2 ha of the
minimumrequirements of 8 ha (Riau 63%, SouthKalimantan 93%, andWest Java 93%);
and (3) Potential agent does not know how to apply for a loan to the formal financial
institutions (Riau 71%, SouthKalimantan 71%, andWest Java 41%.
The availability of the RFL CFP Fund not automatically increase the interest of
farmers to borrow, because the RFL CFP is incompatible with the existing credit
system applied in their villages, which is: (1) Most of lenders are from the same village
(Riau 57%, SouthKalimantan 59%), and the lender distance is less than 1 km (Riau 78%,
South Kalimantan 58%), and (2) the loan amount is small (in Riau 87% farmers
borrowing < Rp 500,000, and 43% from 87% borrowing < Rp 100,000), while in
SouthKalimantan 45% (≤Rp500,000) and 22% (Rp500,000 -Rp 1,000,000).
The above facts indicate that the principal location in Jakarta would restrain the
farmers as prospective agent to access the RFL CFP and the difference amount of RFL
CFPwith their old local loan potentially caused problems, such as: (1) high transaction
cost due to high travel expenses to Jakarta, (2) Moral hazard, especially if the RFL CFP
funds are used by agents for cost of consumption (the RFL CFP minimum is
Rp 68,255,200 per one IUPHHK (business licence of timber utilization), and (3)Not all
Characteristics of farmers and markets
et al
Farmers perception toward the RFL CFP Scheme
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of the farmers are interested in borrowing in large amount of money since they believe
that it would be a sin if they can not return the money. Hence, the beneficiaries of the
RFL CFP are commonly rich farmers and investors, while the farmers who are not
bankable remainmarginalized (adverse selection).
Conditions mentioned above indicate that: (1) there are differences in perception
between agent and principal, (2) information owned by the principal and the agent is
not symmetric (asymmetric information), and (3) the capacity of principals and agents
is imbalance. The differences on perceptions will affect the involvement of parties;
information that is not symmetric is often used by either party to perform moral
hazard; and the difference of capacity will constrain the implementation and
achievement of planned target.
Perceptions of parties (excluding farmers) towards the RFL CFP Scheme can be
summarized as follows:
1. Companies managing timber plantations in Riau, South Kalimantan andWest Java:
(1) They are not interested in being a partner or theCFPdevelopers; (2) They believe
that the CFP will fail if the spatial structure is not corrected and (3) overlapping in
the regulations, (4) rights and obligations of the communitiesmust be reaffirmed, (5)
the capacity of communities in cultivation, maintenance, and harvesting is still low,
and (6) the financial institution that manages funds of the RFL CFP must have
sufficient capacity.
2. BPDAS (MoF units in provincial level): the RFL CFP is important, but this is not
the only input; other production inputs are also important. The problems,
according to BPDAS, are: (1) no aasurance of land right, (2) lack of coaching and
mentoring, (3) complex timber administration (TUK), and (4) no guarantee of
market.
3. Dinas Kehutanan (forestry service at the district and provincial levels): (1) the RFL
CFP procedures are complex and difficult to implement, (2) the RFL CFP is not
appropriate for farmers, (3) the commitment of the parties is still lacking, (4)
simplify theTUK, and (5) there is nomarket guarantee,
4. Academicians and researchers: (1) the RFL CFP rules are too complicated, (2) the
capacity of farmers is low, (3) need a market guarantee, (4) local government
commitmentmust be increased, and (5) timber business is not prospective.
5. BPD dan BRI (formal financial institutions): (1) RFL CFP Regulations should
provide business assurance to farmers, (2) financial management capacity is low, (3)
credits of forest plantation are not attractive due to the long payback time and big
risk, and, (4) the licensing of theRFLCFP should not lead to high transaction costs.
From the statement smentioned above, the parties are very supportive to the RFL
CFP, but they are pesimistic about the success of the RFL CFP (the RFL CFP may fail
D. Perceptions of parties (excluding farmers) towards the RFL CFP Scheme
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just like KUK DAS and KUHR), especially if the aspects that could potentially cause
problems to the bussiness are not resolved by the principal.
There are several aspects which can be taken as lessons for the development of the
RFL CFP. Perceptions of agents toward the DSA RAD are as follows: (1) 77% of the
agents agreed that CDA RAD role in supplying capital is very big, (2) 100% of agents
agreed that CDA RAD is very easy, (3) 100% of agents stated that the requirements of
borrowing is very easy, which only require IDCard and Family card, (3) 44% of agents
involved in making the rules of loan (interest, penalties, procedures, requirements), (4)
93% of agents agreed that credit of CDA RAD is in accordance with their wishes and
needs, and (5) 100% of agents stated that the collateral is not burdensome. Collateral is
stipulated at ameeting betweenprincipal and agent.
The physical environments that support the development of the RFLCFP are: (1)
89% of agents stated that they could easily obtain means of production, (2) 52% of
agents stated the distance to the market is near, and (3) 85% of agents stated means of
transport is easy. In terms of accesibility of FGA members to the markets stated that:
(1) 68% of agents stated that transport costs are intermediate, and (2) 48% of agents said
that number of buyerwas 1-2 people. The dimensions of business of FGAmembers: (1)
63% of agents have one kind of business, (2) 47% of agents carry on business for 1 - 10
years, and (3) 33%of them for 10 - 20 years.
Perception of agents to principal and procedure of the CDA RAD is positive and
satisfied (≥90%). The positive perceptions cannot be separated from the rules and
guidelines that accomodated their social capital. Participation in making loan
requirement and procedures, including refund and sanction within the group has
increased the commitment and participation of agents. FGA at the village level
appointed as a principal, has low transaction costs,moral hazard, and adverse selection.
The existence of rights and obligations of the Ministry of Agriculture and local
governments, along with the rules and guidelines that can be adapted to the conditions
of each region has increased the commitment of local government. The commitment is
realized through an intensive mentoring in the early establisment by the extension
officers and administrators of the FGA, while local governments, subdistrict, and
village heads assist inmonitoring. The involvement of the parties outside the principal
and agent did not increase the transaction cost.
The physical environment also support the agency business, such as easy access to
the production means and short distance to the market. Unfavorabee aspects of the
physical environment, have ease the agent to sell directly to the market. However, the
agents may also sell their products through the principal, and they would help
marketing farmers' products in exchangewhich are approved byboth parties.
E. Perceptions of agents towards the CDA RAD, and factors that contribute to
its success
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